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THE REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AFFECTING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Warren F. Schwartz* and Eugene W. Harper, Jr.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

writing of this paper began as a search for a standard. We
were aware that implementation of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1 provisions looking to the eventual
elimination of "subsidies"2 that "distort" international trade had
fallen on hard times. In the case of export subsidies for manufactured
goods, where hope was initially entertained that obligations banning
the use of such subsidies might be assumed by all members, an extended series of negotiations ultimately produced a renunciation
of subsidies, which has been accepted by only seventeen developed
countries.8 The developing countries continue to utilize and defend
the propriety of export subsidies.4 Little progress has been made with
respect to other measures, such as production subsidies and the price
supports for agriculture, that were to be removed by agreement
,vi.thin the framework of general trade negotiations.5 Finally, only
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I. 61 Stat. pt. 5, at A3 (1947), T .I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The acronym
GATT is used to describe both the multilateral trade agreement, originally promulgated in 1947 and subsequently am.ended in several material respects, and the
organization that implements the agreement. The text of the basic agreement and
various annexes containing protocols, explanatory notes, and tables giving the official
citation in the United Nations Treaties Series and effective date of the multitude of
agreements comprising the GATT framework are collected in IV GATT, BASIC
INsrRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter BISD]. Three recent works
deal generally with the history and present activities of GATT: G. CURZoN, MULTI·
LATERAL COMll!ERCIAL DIPLOMACY, THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 'TRADE
AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL COMMERCIAL POLICillS AND TECHNIQUE (1965); K. DAM,
THE GATT; L\W AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); J. JACKSON,
WoRLD TRADE AND THE L\w OF GATT (1969).
'
2. See GATT, arts. VI and XVI. We will treat the term subsidy at this point to mean
simply a payment by a government to some private person or firm. We deal with the
complexities involved in defining and using the term in note 37 infra and accompanying
text.
3. Declaration of November 19, 1960, Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4,
9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961). See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 374 n.24.
4. See Note by the Secretariat, Incentives for Industrial Exports from Developing
Countries, GATT Doc. Com. TD/72 (March 17, 1970); Rom, GATT: Export Subsidies
and Developing Countries, 2 J. WoRI.D TRADE L. 544 (1968).
5. See K. DAM, supra note 1, at 147, 257-72, esp. 266; J. JACKSON, supra note I, at
717; Malmgren &: Schlechty, Rationalizing World Agricultural Trade, 4 J. WoRI.D
TRADE L. 515 (1970).
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limited agreement could be reached in principle about the types of
national government support that ought to be eliminated as indirect
subsidies.6
This development has been viewed as part of the over-all decline
in the role of GATT, which has been widely noted and deplored. 7
Essentially two types of proposals have been advanced to restore the
general effectiveness of GATT as an instrument of international
trade regulation. 8 One holds that GATT must be reformulated in
order to establish norms that will be regarded in some degree as
obligatory by participants in the domestic political processes that
largely shape international trade policy. The competing view asserts
that such an effort would be counterproductive, because the attempt
to extend the orbit of "illegality" to practices that nations wish to
employ will only serve to worsen the atmosphere in which negotia6. The GA'IT panel on subsidies concluded that "it was neither necessary nor
feasible to seek an agreed interpretation of what constituted a subsidy. It would prob•
ably be impossible to arrive at a definition which would at the same time include all
measures that fall within the intended meaning of the term in Article XVI without
including others not so intended." Report of the Panel on Subsidies, 10th Supp BISD
201, 208 (1962). An earlier report had, however, listed a group of measures which "the
governments prepared to accept the declaration [cited in note 3 supra had] ••• agreed
that, for the purpose of that declaration • • • [were] to be considered as subsidies in
the sense of Article XVI:4." Report of the Panel on Subsidies, 9th Supp. BISD 185, 187
(1961). The remaining countries "were not able to subscribe ••• to a precise interpreta•
tion of the term 'subsidies', but had no objection to the ••• interpretation being ac•
cepted by the ••• parties to [the] declaration." Id. The measures were
(a) Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on
exports or re-exports;
(b) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to exporters;
(c) The remission, calculated in relation to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare
charges on industrial or commercial enterprises;
(d) The exemption, in respect of exported goods, of charges or taxes, other than
charges in connexion with importation or indirect taxes levied at one or several
stages on the same goods if sold for internal consumption; or the payment, in
respect of exported goods, of amounts exceeding those effectively levied at one or
several stages on these goods in the form of indirect taxes or of charges in connexion with importation or in both forms;
(e) In respect of deliveries by governments or governmental agencies of imported
raw materials for export business on different terms than for domestic business,
the charging of prices below world prices;
(f) In respect of government export credit guarantees, the charging of premiums
at rates which are manifestly inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs
and losses of the credit insurance institutions;
(g) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments)
of export credits at rates below those which they have to pay in order to obtain
the funds so employed;
·
(h) The government bearing all or part of the costs incurred by e.xporters in obtaining credit.
Id. at 186-87.
7. See K. DAM, supra note 1, at 8; J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1-3; Hudec, GATT
or GABB? The Future Design of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE
L.J. 1299 (1971).
8. See Hudec, supra note 7 (review of the proposals that have been advanced to im•
prove the functioning of GATT).

April 1972]

Subsidies Affecting International Trade

833

tions are conducted. The real need, it is urged, is for a better procedural framework in which to strive for agreement.
We thought that an examination of the issues underlying the
unresolved subsidy question, 9 with a view to seeing if it was possible
to formulate a rule that both gives effect to the essential considerations and is susceptible to objective application, might illuminate
the basic controversy about how best to structure the regulation of
international trade. And so we began our search for a standard.
We believe that we have succeeded in isolating the essential factor that explains the failure of existing regulation to deal effectively
with the problems of subsidies. A subsidy is treated in the GATT
framework as a "distortion" of international trade,10 that is, as creating a disparity between the actual costs incurred in producing a
particular good and those which must be borne by the firm undertalcing its production.11 In fact, however, much (perhaps all) government support can be defended as being a "correction" rather than a
"distortion" of the market process. The need for correction is said
to derive from the existence of "externalities,"12 that is, costs or benefits that are borne or reaped by nonparties to a transaction13 and are
9. The point has frequently been made that because of the substantial reduction
in conventional trade barriers, i.e., tariffs and quantitative restrictions, the relative
importance of measures such as subsidies has greatly increased. See, e.g., R. BALDWIN,
NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 110 (1970); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, REPORT: UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
EcONOI>fiC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 89 (1971); Report of the Panel on
Subsidies, 10th Supp. BISD 201, 202, para. 5 (1962).
10. See w. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE REsToRATION OF WoRID TRADE, AN
ANALYSIS AND A.I'l'RAISAL OF THE ITO CHARTER AND THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE 214-15 (1950); K. DAM, supra note 1, at 132.
11. Curiously, there is no distinction drawn among subsidies on the basis of the
policy objectives they are designed to implement. The subsidy as an instrument of
policy has received considerable attention in the economic literature. The conceptual
development can be traced through a reading of the following articles: Haberler, Some
Problems in the Pure Theory of International Trade, 60 ECON. J. 223 (1950); Bhagwati
&: Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 71
J. PoL. ECON. 44 (1963), both reprinted in AM. EcoN. AssN., READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 213, 230 (R. Caves &: H. Johnson ed. 1968); Johnson, Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions, in TRADE, GROWTH, AND THE BALANCE
OF PAYMENrS 3 (1965); J. BHAGWATI, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL POLICY:
DEPARTURES FROM UNIFIED ExCHANGE RATES (Princeton Essays in Intl. Fin. No. 8, 1968).
12. See Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay,
9 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1 (1971), which is a concise discussion of a great deal of the important
writing on this subject. See also Buclxanan &: Stubblebine, Externality, 29 EcoNOMICA
371 (1962), reprinted in READINGS IN MICROECONOMICS 477 (W. Breit &: H. Hochman ed.
1968).
13. Whether one will be a party to a transaction depends on the costs of organizing
and effectuating a bargain or series of bargains. If the costs of the transaction exceed
the benefit that could be derived, the person will not participate. See G. TUI.LOCK,
PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC MEANs 47 (1970); Demsetz, The Private Production of Public
Goods, 13 J. LAW & ECON, 293 (1970).
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not therefore taken into account in the market process.14
As a result, the issue is not that of identifying and remedying
"distortions" but rather of determining if a particular measure on
balance "corrects" or "distorts" the market process, that is, whether
it increases or decreases the efficiency with which resources are allocated. Resolution of this question turns upon theoretical and empirical judgments about how well the domestic political system performs
the tasks of deciding what intervention should be undertaken and implementing the program that is adopted.
Our inquiry then is into the contribution that an international
regulatory system can make to improve the process of assessing and
compensating for externalities. There are three ways this contribution may be made. First, domestic measures might be tested by some
international standard of over-all efficiency enhancement. Secondly,
the domestic political process could be altered by international agreement-for example, one requiring a two-thirds majority in the national legislature before a particular type of measure could become
effective. Finally, power to take account of certain externalities could
be lodged in an international body.
We will begin by examining the basic contours of the present
GATT regulation of subsidies. We will then consider the theory of
comparative advantage underlying the GATT regime and introduce
the complications of externalities and the governmental process designed to take account of them. Finally, we will make some tentative
suggestions for changes in rules and institutions that might serve to
improve the present state of affairs.
II.

THE

GATT

PROVISIONS

Three notions seem to explain the GATT regulation of subsidies. First, if the government pays a share of a firm's costs, the firm
may be able to capture sales (either in the domestic or in the foreign
market) from more efficient rivals who do not receive government
support. As explained below, if this capture takes place, a misallocation of resources and a consequent decrease in world production may
result. The second notion is that some of the reasons which lead governments to subsidize must be accepted in fashioning international
regulation. This concept has not been systematically implemented
in the regulatory scheme. The final idea is that a government may
14. Air pollution is the classic example of an external cost or, as it is often termed,
negative externality. See Kirgis, Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries:
International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH. L,
REv. 859 (1972).
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subsidize export sales in order to enable a domestic firm to compete
unfairly by underselling its rivals in foreign markets. The objective
of this tactic presumably is to reap monopoly profits when competition is diminished sufficiently for the subsidized firm to secure "market power."
The GATT pattern of regulation reflects unresolved tensions
among these often conflicting notions. Section A of article XVI of
GATT requires notification of "any su~sidy, including any form of
income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any
product into, [a] territory." This section reflects the first notion described above, the objection to a subsidy as causing a misallocation
of resources by enabling a firm to capture sales from a more efficient
rival. The section does not, however, come to grips with the second
basic notion-the justification for certain subsidies. Instead, apparently because no standard for separating good from bad reasons
could be devised, the remedial system imposes no substantive prohibition whatever. If, however, "serious prejudice to the interests of
any other contracting party is caused or threatened by ... [the] subsidization," the subsidizing party is called upon to "discuss with the
other ... party or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the subsidization."16 Thus the
section articulating the fundamental objection to subsidies as a cause
of the misallocation of the world's resources does nothing more than
call for notification and, only if serious prejudice to another country
may result, consultation with the interested parties or responsible
GATT officials.
Section B of article XVI deals principally with subsidies on exports. Export subsidies are viewed more harshly under sectionB than
are subsidies in general under section A. There appear to be two
reasons for the different attitude. First, as is more fully explained below,16 it is more difficult to justify export subsidies than production
or consumption subsidies on grounds of efficiency. Most of the "externalities" that subsidies are designed to correct apply equally to goods
sold domestically and to those traded internationally. This distinction is often drawn in the literature;17 however, we are not aware of
any evidence indicating what significance, if any, it had in the framing of the GATT provision. The second respect in which export
15. GATT, art. XVI, sec. A, para. 1.
16. See pt. m. B. infra.
17. See J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 11; Johnson, supra note 11, at 6.
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subsidies vary from subsidies in general undoubtedly did influence
the adoption of a more severe treatment for some types of export subsidies. This reason is based on the third notion discussed above-that
export subsidies enable a firm to sell at a lower price in the foreign
market in order to eliminate competition and then reap monopoly
profits.18
As in section A, the provisions of section B reflect an awareness
that the regulation must take into account certain national policies
underlying the grant of export subsidies. The result is a two-part solution that provides different treatment for subsidies on primary and
nonprimary products.19 With respect to export subsidies on primary
products, which are commonly used throughout the world, the parties are called upon only to "seek to avoid ... [their] use." 20 Thus
this provision goes beyond section A in actually condemning the
export subsidies through the "seek to avoid" formulation, but stops
short, in apparent recognition of their widespread use, of a comprehensive prohibition.21
The portion of section B dealing with export subsidies on nonprimary products goes farthest in prohibiting use of the device. The
parties are called upon at "the earliest practicable date" to stop using
18. The most influential articulation of the notion that subsidies may be a form
of government-supported price discrimination can be found in J. VINER, DUMPING: A
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90, 163 (1923). See also w. BROWN, supra note 10, at
117.
19. A primary product is defined as "any product of farm, forest or fishery, or
any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is custom•
arily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade,"
GATT, ad art. XVI, sec. B, note 2,
20. GATT, art. XVI, sec. B, para. 3. Although all of the other parts of section B deal
only with subsidies on exports, paragraph 3 anomalously provides that if "any form
of subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product" is granted, it
"shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more
than an equitable share of world export trade in that product" (emphasis added). The
fundamental meaning of the phrase "equitable share" has never been articulated, For
a review of the decisions interpreting the term, see J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 393-95,
and authorities cited therein.
One possible meaning of economic significance would be that share of the market
that a country would have in the absence of any subsidies or other government intervention. Such an interpretation would restrict the use of subsidies to instances in
which it was necessary to offset interventionist measures by other countries, Applica•
tion of this standard would require complex evaluations based on "second-best theory."
That is, it would be necessary to decide what would happen if there were no inter•
vention and then to determine if the particular measure, in light of the fact that
there is existing intervention, represents a movement toward or away from the outcome
that would have been reached without government intervention. See Lipsey & Lancaster,
The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REv. OF EcoN. STUDIES 11 (1956). We will
not deal with the question of "second-best" justification for subsidies.
21. The failure to prohibit these subsidies may also reflect a recognition that they
may sometimes be a second-best solution in the face of import restrictions on primary
products that countries often impose,
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subsidies that result "in the sale of [a] product for export at a price
lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to
buyers in the domestic market."22 In 1961, seventeen countries declared their willingness to cease the use of such subsidies.23 The
strength of this provision apparently results from three factors.
There is first the relative skepticism about the justification for
export subsidies noted above-although again no evidence of the
influence of this idea can be adduced. Second, export subsidies for
nonprimary products are much less commonly employed. Finally,
and perhaps most significantly, the prohibition is limited to instances
in which a lower price is being charged in export sales-cases presumably in which subsidization is being practiced as a species of
"unfair competition"-the third basic notion behind the GATT
subsidy provisions.
Article VI, the second principal GATT provision dealing with
subsidies, authorizes individual importing countries to neutralize the
effect of a subsidy by levying a "countervailing duty" in "an amount
equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy ... granted, directly or
indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of [the] product."24 The countervailing duty cannot be levied, however, unless
the "effect of the ... subsidization ... is ... to cause or threaten
material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to
retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry." 25 Thus
22. GATT, art. XVI, sec. B, para. 4.
23. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
24. GATT, art. VI, para. 3.
25. GATT, art. VI, para. 6(a). Article VI is included within part II of GATT,
which applies "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Protocol
of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, para. l(b), IV BISD 77 (1969). The American countervailing duty statute (now
19 U.S.C. 1303 (1970)) predates GATT and need not by reason of the Protocol of
Provisional Application conform to article VI. Countervailing duties have been levied
very infrequently under American law, apparently in large part because of the un•
willingness of the Executive to invoke the statute. The text of the American law varies
materially from the GATT provision since it does not forbid the levying of both
countervailing and dumping duties, does not except failure to collect or remission of
tax on exports, and has no injury requirement. It also extends to privately financed
subsidization but has never been so applied. The variation, however, has in practice
been much less. Both countervailing and dumping duties are not levied, and remission
of no more than a tax previously levied (despite early judicial authority indicating
the contrary-see Nicholas &: Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1918); Downs v. United
States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903)) has not been regarded as a subsidy. It is impossible to say
whether a species of "injury" requirement has in fact been applied. The Treasury Department exercises considerable discretion in deciding whether to impose a countervailing duty. See United States v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1031 (C.C.P.A.),
cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1971). It seems reasonable to suppose that
the impact on a domestic industry is a factor bearing on the exercise of discretion. However, no explanation of the Treasury's exercise of discretion in a particular case is
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the provision does not distinguish between export subsidies and subsidies in general, primary and nonprimary products, or the various
reasons why the government may have intervened. The only limitation on the general authorization is that the requisite injury or threat
of injury to a domestic industry be demonstrated. This provision
appears then to represent the most unambiguous application of the
"unfair competition" rationale for regulating subsidies.
We shall not treat at length the question of "unfair competition"
through government subsidization of export sales. This special case
need not be dealt with in resolving the basic issue of how the "distorting" and "efficiency-enhancing" aspects of government subsidization are to be reconciled. If a subsidy may lead to the misallocation
of resources in all instances in which it has the effect described by
section A of article XVI-that is, when it operates to increase exports
or decrease imports-there is reason enough to ban its use regardless
of whether it also leads to the subsidized firm's gaining market power.
If what is needed is some threshold requirement of substantiality in
the impact of the subsidy, this can be stated in straightforward terms
without the extraneous notion, introduced by the "injury" concept,
of damage to the competitive vitality of a domestic industry.
We do say in passing that recent ·writing about the problem of
price discrimination casts very great doubt on the validity of the
idea that selling below cost ("predatory pricing") in a market is an
effective way to gain and enjoy market power. This basic notion,
which underlies the regulation both of "dumping" (in which the
firm itself finances the "predatory pricing") and of subsidies (as
government-financed "predatory pricing"), has been disputed on
both empirical and theoretical grounds. 26 The point simply is that
publicly available. As to the application of the American law, see generally Butler,
Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidiuztion, A Re-Emerging Issue in International
Trade, 9 VA. J. INTL. L. 82 (1968); Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination
of Subsidies, Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty
Law, 1 LAw & PoL. IN INTL. Bus. 17 (1969); U.S. Treasury Dept., Countervailing Duties,
in PAPERS SUBMIITED TO THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND lNVESnmNT
POLICY 409 (1971) (summarizing general enforcement policy).
26. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 548, 587 (1969),
and authorities cited therein. There is a secondary justification offered for prohibiting
international price discrimination. The idea basically is that a firm selling at a lower
price in one market must-- be obtaining the financing to do so from some source-for
example, monopoly profits in the home market or government support-and that this
source is somehow "unreliable." If the likelihood that this support will continue is for
some reason exceptionally difficult to appraise, then conceivably domestic rivals will
make costly mistakes in responding to the foreign competition that the government
might be able to prevent (at a cost lower than the social cost of the mistakes) by ap•
propriate intervention. The whole question is complicated by the fact that charging
different prices may not reflect any "artficial" support at home but rather factors such
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in order for the tactic to be feasible, the gains from monopoly pricing after all rivals have been driven out and before the high price
causes re-entry and renewed competition must exceed the losses incurred in selling below cost during the "predatory" stage. The empirical evidence indicates that this will rarely if ever be the case.27
In any event, government-financed "predatory pricing" is a different question from the one with which we wish to deal. Our interest is in examining the reasons why the great range of subsidies,
which are not used in a "predatory" fashion, are granted, in order
to decide how they ought to be regulated in a well-conceived system
of international trade regulation. To do this we must first develop
more fully the theory of comparative advantage upon which GATT
is fundamentally grounded.

III.

THE THEORY OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AND SUBSIDIES

A.

The Traditional Analysis

The theory of comparative advantage28 represents an adaptation
to international trade of the basic notion that the value of domestic
output will be maximized if resources are allocated through private
market transactions.29 This theory assumes that most factors of production move freely in the domestic market to locations where the
highest value is placed upon them. In the international market,
however, there is insufficient mobility of certain factors of production
for a completely efficient allocation of resources.30 Many factors do
as decreasing average costs or the desire to enter a market by initially charging "promotional" prices. In any event, the recent developments on these questions have not
been brought to bear in a systematic re-evaluation of the international regulation of
what is conceived to be privately or publicly financed dumping. See K. DAM, supra
note 1, at 170-72 (suggesting need for re-evaluation): Anthony, The American Response

to Dumping from Capitalist and Socialist Economies-Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967 GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 159, 163-77
(1968) (reviewing economic justification of present dumping laws).
27. See Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. LA.w &: EcoN. 43
(1969); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LA.w &:
ECON. 137 (1958).
28. For three general treatments of the theory (in roughly ascending order of difficulty), see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS ch. 34 (8th ed. 1970): C. KlNDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOJIUCS chs. 1-3 (4th ed. 1968); H. HELLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THEORY
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE chs. 1-5, esp. ch. 2 (1968).
29. This statement, to be strictly true, must assume perfect competition and an
acceptable initial distribution of wealth.
30. See, e.g., H. HELLER, supra note 28, at 3. The question of how freely factors do
in fact move is an empirical matter. The theoretical work begins, however, with an
assumption of complete immobility which may, of course, be relaxed in varying degrees
when dealing with particular questions. See id. at 3-4, 6; C. KlNDLEBERGER, supra note
28, at 4-6.
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not freely cross national boundaries and, therefore, a given country
may be deficient in the resources necessary to engage efficiently in
certain industries. Consequently, if all countries were to attempt to
satisfy their domestic demands solely with domestically produced
goods, total world production would be less than could be achieved
through trade. For all countries will gain economically if each country first specializes in the production of those goods in which it has
the greatest efficiency relative to alternative uses of domestic resources
and then trades with other countries that similarly allocate their resources.31
The objection to subsidies within this framework is that they
distort the resource-allocating function of the market and thereby
reduce the benefits derived from specialization reflecting comparative advantage coupled with trade. When, for example, a government makes a payment to the producer of a certain good, the subsidy reduces the cost of production, or private cost, as it appears to
the producer without reducing the real or social cost32 of such production, that is, the output that must be forgone in order to make
the subsidized goods. As a result of the subsidy, resources will be
employed in producing the subsidized goods rather than other goods
of greater real value. The domestic loss, then, is the drop in the value
of total domestic output that occurs when resources are not put to
their most productive use.
Subsidies, moreover, not only force domestic resources from their
most productive use but also divert otherwise efficiently allocated
resources from competing foreign industries by denying to those industries the sales captured by the subsidized product. Thus, neither
the domestic nor foreign country specializes in accordance with comparative advantage and total world output is reduced.

Externalities, Subsidies, and Welfare
The preceding simpiified analysis does not take account of externalities.33 Since resources are allocated in private market transacB.

31. We have stressed the gains from specialization in production, which are most
significant for our analysis. If two countries have different preferences for goods
("Community Indifference Curves'), they could both be made better off through trade
even if it is assumed that they are identical from the viewpoint of production, There
are thus gains to be derived from specialization in consumption as well as production,
See H. HELLER, supra note 28, ch. 4.
32. We use the term social cost to mean what is often called "real" or "opportunity"
cost. For an explanation of this concept, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
LAW &: ECON, 1 (1960).
33. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
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tions by people responding to prices that they are offered for
performing various tasks, the failure of an externality to affect the
price (by either increasing or decreasing it) leads to a misallocation
of resources. This misallocation occurs because market choices are
made among alternative uses of resources not on the basis of the social value of those uses but on the basis of a price that varies from
the social value by the amount of the externalities arising from those
uses.
It will be recalled that the traditional analysis found subsidies
objectionable not because they lowered private costs but rather
because they made private costs appear lower than social costs. But
externalities may exist that cause social costs in fact to be lower than
private costs. For if the value that society places on the production of
a good is not, for some reason, fully reflected in market transactions,
its social value is higher and the costs to society of forgone production
are correspondingly lower. Under these conditions, a subsidy in the
amount that nonparty beneficiaries would pay if there were a functioning market for the externality can theoretically be justified as increasing efficiency. This kind of subsidy would, moreover, add to,
rather than reduce, the gains from trade coupled with specialization,
which are predicted by the theory of comparative advantage. 34
We shall try to illuminate these points by considering three types
of subsidies that have significant impact on international trade. Before examining these measures, however, it is necessary to clarify
certain threshold verbal and conceptual ambiguities in the meaning
of the term "subsidy," 35 which we have so far confined to the case
of a direct payment.
As we have indicated, the international regulation of subsidies
is thought to be required because their effect on private costs results
in the misallocation of resources. The difficulty is that the simplified
model under which subsidies are viewed as "distortions" takes no
account whatever of a public sector. If nothing else is happening in
the public sector and firm A receives a hundred dollar payment, it
can fairly be said to be subsidized in that amount. When, however,
account is taken of the fact that there is a governmeJ!t that is both
1

34. See note 11 supra.
35. See E. ROLPH, THE THEORY OF FISCAL ECONOMICS (1954); Hubbell, Concealed
Subsidies in the Federal Budget, IO NAn.. TAX J. 214 (1957); Kaysen, On Defining a
Subsidy, in PUBLIC POLICY 1 (Harvard Grad. School of Pub. Adm. Y.B. 1953); Robinson,
What Is a Government Subsidy?, 20 NAn. TAX J. 86 (1967); Subsidies and SubsidyEffect Programs of the U.S. Government (Materials prepared for the Joint Economic
Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1965)).
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taxing and spending, the issue becomes much more complex.86 Every
activity is potentially subject to the burden of taxation and the benefit of government expenditure. The choice among activities in the
private sector is inevitably influenced by the net impact of burden
and benefit created by the public sector. The issue in assessing the
impact on resource allocation of a particular form of government
intervention then becomes not simply whether an amount is paid
to or received by a firm but, more generally, whether the measure
in some way alters the relative profitability of various activities. For
example, if it is assumed that everyone is engaged either in farming
or manufacturing and a statute is passed granting farmers ten dollars
per unit of output and manufacturers one dollar per unit of output,
the effect is to increase the allocation of resources to farming. But
the same effect would result from differential tax rates favoring
farmers.
We will use the term "subsidy," therefore, to extend to all government revenue and expenditure measures that have the effect of
altering returns to various activities and thereby influencing the
allocation of resources. 87 In using the term, we do not imply any
36. The notion that there is no "neutral" place to begin an evaluation of govern•
ment intervention since existing government structure must be assumed is analyzed
in C. SHOUP, PuBLIC FINANCE 7-19 (1969).
37. Our analysis would in theory extend beyond taxing and spending to include,
for example, quantitative restrictions or qualitative requirements that have resourceallocation effects. Our definition of subsidies is broader than others that have been
employed. Most significantly, we include measures having allocational effects that may
have been designed principally to redistribute income according to some prevailing
n.otion of "equity." We include these both because the precise objective of a given
measure is often unclear and because redistribution by government is frequently justified
on grounds of efficiency as well. That is, redistributional taxation and transfer of wealth
can be viewed as a way for the relatively affluent to purchase the direct or indirect
benefits which result when others in the society enjoy a decent living standard. (Com•
pare the limited definition of the term, excluding provisions principally designed for
income redistribution, adopted for purposes of evaluating the American tax laws by
Aaron, Inventory of Existing Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX lNSTlTUTE OF AMERICA,
TAX INCENTIVES 39, 40-41 (1971); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 705, 706-13 (1970)).
We have also excluded from consideration the subject of border tax adjustments,
that is, the rebate of value-added taxes on exports and the corresponding imposition of
an equivalent tax on imports. There are several reasons for this exclusion. First, the
issue of the resource-allocation effect of these measures is largely an empirical one, and
turns on the question of who bears the incidence of the tax. Second, if the border tax
adjustment leads to an over-all increase in the price of imports and a decrease in the
price of exports, it is equivalent to a partial devaluation and correctible under the
present monetary system through adjustments of the exchange rate. Finally, to the
extent that the border tax adjustment is a reflection of the prevailing notion of tax
"equity"-that is, that "consumption" should be the basis for distributing the tax
burden-adequate treatment would involve the range of issues subsumed under the
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judgment about the desirability of the particular measure in question.
It is now necessary, as the final preliminary matter before considering the various examples of subsidies affecting international
trade, to explain more fully the criterion of efficiency-enhancement
that we will apply in analyzing the effects of subsidies in these areas.
Modem welfare economics proceeds on the assumption that it is impossible (noneconomic value judgments aside) to make interpersonal
comparisons of the amount of satisfaction ("utility") that people
realize from the occurrence of various events.38 The basic yardstick
is therefore individual preference-which, however, need not in any
psychological sense be selfish. Utility can be assigned, for example,
to alleviation of the suffering of other people.
Since interpersonal comparisons cannot be made, the controlling
standard in evaluating a given event must take into consideration
all preferences held by individuals in the group under consideration.
The standard that is generally applied is that of Pareto optimality:
A change in price or output in an economy is a move toward Pareto
optimality only when someone is made better off and no one is made
worse off. Pareto optimality is theoretically reached when it is not
possible to make someone better off without making someone else
worse off, that is, when the possibilities of improvement through
voluntary exchange have been exhausted.89 In order to know whether
a given change represents a move toward Pareto optimality, it is necessary to know when individuals are in fact better off-to know their
preferences. As has been noted above, we will be dealing principally
with situations in which all of the relevant preferences are not revealed in private transactions so that the government, in order to approximate Pareto optimality, attempts to assess and give effect to the
additional preferences.
We ·will now consider how three government measures, often
question of fiscal harmonization. See FISCAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MARKE'I's,
VoLTJME 1: THEORY (C. Shoup ed. 1967).
For a detailed discussion of the subject of border tax adjustments, see, e.g., C. FULDA
&: W. SCHWARTZ, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT 469-79, and authorities cited in 474 n.1 (1970); J. GASTON&: w. SMITH,
BORDER TAXES AND INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC COMl'ETITION '(1970).
88. See J. BUCHANAN&: G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 171 (Univ. of Mich.
Press ed. 1965); E. MxsHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TEN !NTRODUCIORY EsSAYS 14 (1969).
39. v. PARETO, MANUEL D'ECONOMIE l'OLITIQUE (1909). For a succinct review of the
literature following Pareto's original formulation, see Bator, The Simple Analytics of
Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. EcoN. REv. 22, 57-58 (1957), reprinted in READINGS, supra
note 12, at 385, 410.
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asserted to have substantial impact on international trade, may serve
to produce a more efficient resource allocation, that is, resource allocation more consonant with the actual production possibilities and
consumer preferences than that yielded by wholly private transactions. We will then consider the process by which the government
intervention is framed and implemented in order to appraise its
effectiveness in achieving the desired improvement.
1.

Research and Development

Much research and development is conducted at government expense.40 It appears, moreover, that in technologically sophisticated
countries like the United States there may be a significant correlation
between the level of research and development in an industry and
the propensity to export.41
Presumably if one country subsidizes research and development,
firms benefiting from the government expenditure will be able to
prevail over rivals in other countries that might otherwise be more
efficient but receive no government support and must therefore bear
the cost of introducing new products and methods of production.42
This is a specific instance of the conventional objection to subsidies.
The complicating factor, however, in assessing the impact on efficiency of subsidies of this kind is that the government's support of
research and development may be designed to account for certain
externalities. The basic reason for the subsidy may be that the full
value of the benefits created by privately conducted research, especially in the case of basic research, may not be captured by the firm
40. See C. FREEMAN & A. YOUNG, THE R.EsEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORT IN
EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION, esp. Table 4, at 72 (1965);
E. MANSFIELD, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ch. VI (1968). It has been
estimated that the provision of American tax law permitting research and development
outlays to be treated as expenses rather than capital investments (INT. REv. CODE OF
1954-, § 174) constitutes an annual subsidy of 500 million dollars. Surrey, supra note 37,
at 709. It may be helpful to emphasize that subsidization of research and development
may, but need not, be efficiency enhancing. J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHAL•
LENGE 112-22 (1968), compared American support for research and development on the
SST favorably with the British and French effort on the Concorde.
41. See O'Brien, Trade Patterns and Technology, 5 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 657 (1971).
42. This assertion, of course, assumes that the results of the research and development efforts are enjoyed only by a limited group of firms in the country. See, in this
regard, France v. Commission of the European Communities, No. 47 /69 (Eur. Ct, J.
June 25, 1970), which held invalid under article 92 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, done at Rome March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], that part of a French textile tax on imports used to subsidize re•
search. France argued that all firms in the industry benefited from the research, but
the Court concluded that French firms benefited far more than did non-French firms.
WESTERN
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that undertakes it.43 Some of the knowledge gained will be communicated without payment in exchange to employees, suppliers, customers, and others with whom the firm deals.
These benefits, commonly referred to as "spillover effects," occur
for essentially tw-o reasons. First, there are limits on the protection
afforded by law to knowledge acquired through innovation. Second,
the costs of devising and implementing transactions to capture the
value of some of the benefits derived from the innovation (for example, the knowledge gained by a firm supplying inputs) may exceed
the amount that could be realized. As a result of these various factors,
the amount obtained through private transactions may be less than
the social value of the innovation. Thus government support of research and development can in principle supply an additional return
equal to the value that is not captured in private transactions. If it
performs this function, the result is to enhance efficiency by bringing
to bear as incentive the true value placed by society on the invention
rather than the lesser value manifested in the private transaction.
If the combination of public and private action yields a more
efficient use of domestic resources because the incentive taken into
account more accurately reflects the social value of the innovation,
then the world as a whole can share in the benefits of that use through
international trade. If this objective has actually been accomplished,
the proper response is obviously not an international ban or nullification of the domestic measure. Indeed, the right thing for other
countries to do may well be to try to improve efficiency by similarly
effective use of the public sector.
2.

Agricultural Subsidies

Subsidy programs that increase the income of persons engaged
in farming are a commonplace.44 Criticism that these programs lead
to inefficiency in the allocation of the world's agricultural resources
is a standard component in analyses of international trade regulation by persons committed to the desirability of a free-trade regime.45
43. See E. :MANSFIELD, supra note 40, at 186; Arrow, Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources to Invention, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOl\OC REsEARCH,
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INCENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962). Volume 26 of PUBUC
FINANCE (1971) consists entirely of articles from various countries on the question of
public support of research and development.
44. See C. FUI.DA &: W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 268-306; authorities cited in
note 5 supra.
45. See, e.g., R. BALDWIN, supra note 9, at 113, 117-18, 125-27; Malmgren &: Schlechty,
supra note 5; PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 141.
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We believe, however, that these criticisms are valid only if certain
assumptions are made about the objectives that the government measures are designed to accomplish. Stated within the framework of our
analysis, if the government action is designed to give effect to externalities and succeeds in doing so, it is efficiency enhancing.
There are two principal externalities to which agricultural subsidies may be responsive. First, for reasons of social preference, it
may be thought desirable to keep a certain portion of the population
engaged in agriculture-even if purely private competition would
result in a smaller number of persons remaining in farming. 46
Second, it may be thought desirable to maintain a level of domestic
production so that the country would be self-sufficient to some degree
in the event that foreign supplier countries, for political or military
reasons, chose not to sell to it.47
These reasons can be deplored as misguided by those who disagree with them, but there is no way in principle to reject them as
less legitimate than others in defining what the particular "demand"
is within a country. It is moreover by no means unreasonable to believe that such demand exists. For it has often been pointed out that
income maintenance, which leaves an individual free to choose
his occupation,48 or government payment of the retraining and
relocation costs involved in a change of occupation,40 provide
less costly ways to ameliorate the condition of those who can no
longer engage in agricultural production in a truly competitive
market. But the persistence of programs that have the effect of keeping people in farming and domestic production at a certain level
suggests that there is at least some significant preference for this result quite apart from the desire simply to increase the income of
persons presently engaged in farming.
46. See J. BHAGWAn, supra note 11, at 35; G. CURZON, supra note 1, at 206.
47. See J. BHAGWATJ, supra note 11, at 33. See also SENATE CoMr,r. ON FINANCE, THE
SUGAR Am: AMENDMENT OF 1965, S. REP. No. 909, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965), which
asserts that "it has been the policy of the U.S. Government-for defense and strategic
reasons-to promote within the United States the ability to produce a substantial portion of our sugar requirements.'' The oil import quota has a similar policy objective.
See Dam, Implementation of Import Quotas: The Case of Oil, 14 J. LAw &: EcoN. 1, 3
(1971); Schwartz &: Kindred, American Regulation of Oil Imports: Law, Policy and
International Responsibility, 5 J. WoRLD L. 267 (1971).
48. Such a proposal as part of a program to eliminate gradually the present sub•
sidization of domestic sugar production is offered in Johnson, The Sugar Program:
Costs and Benefits, in NATIONAL ADVISORY COMllfISSION ON FOOD AND FmER, FOREIGN
TRADE AND AGRICULTURAL POLicY 3 (1967).
49. For the suggestion that by reason of "imperfections" in the capital market for
investment in human capital, such as for retraining and relocation, subsidization of
expenditures of this kind may be appropriate, see Johnson, supra note 11, at 28.
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This type of "demand" will not be revealed in private transactions. Although it is theoretically possible for all nonfarmers interested in supporting farming as an occupation (or in maintaining a
particular level of domestic production) to offer a sum of money to
induce the desired activity, such a process would obviously be wholly
impracticable. But, once again, the fact that the demand is not manifested in the market does not mean that it does not exist.
3.

Subsidies to Infant Export Industries

The various reasons for subsidies so far discussed would not
justify a measure limited to exports. There is no reason to believe
that the spillover effects of research and development are encountered
to any larger degree in industries that export. Nor does it matter, if
the objective is to have more people engaged in farming, whether
the product of their efforts is sold at home or abroad. Export subsidies, however, can be justified only on the basis of externalities that
arise in international trade but not in domestic production or consumption.
We believe, again in principle, that justification of this kind
may exist. For example, there are good reasons for granting export
subsidies to infant or "pioneer" export industries.60 The pioneer
firm, in order to succeed in selling a particular type of product in
a new foreign market, must incur expenses to learn about market
conditions and develop an acceptance of its product. The benefits
of these expenses may "spill over" in several ways. Suppliers, customers, employees, and others with whom the firm deals may obtain
knowledge about the foreign market without having to pay for it
and may put that knowledge to use to further their own economic
interests. Firms subsequently attempting to sell in the foreign market
may benefit (again without payment) from the enhanced reputation
of goods emanating from the particular country, which was created
by the pioneer firm. 61 Again, a subsidy reflecting these benefits may
yield a more efficient result than private market transactions.
50. See J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 13; Rom, supra note 4 (which deals with
subsidies in less-developed countries faced with overvalued currencies).
51. Another reason for subsidizing the exports of pioneer firms has been advanced
in the economic literature. Private firms breaking into a new foreign market may systematically overestimate the risks involved-especially those such as imposition of
quotas and tariffs-and at the same time underestimate the capacity of their governments to protect them abroad against losses in foreign markets. Thus private
exporters might need temporary export subsidies to induce them to achieve an optimum level of exports because of this asymmetry between the estimation of risks in the
domestic and foreign markets.
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THE EFFICIENCY OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

We have so far assumed that the government subsidy perfectly
reflects social preferences, and that the information about those
preferences which is necessary to formulate the correct subsidies has
somehow been assembled without cost. Neither of these assumptions,
of course, accords with the reality of how decisions are made in the
political process. The choice is not between a market system that does
not take account of externalities and a political process that perfectly
records and corrects the externalities. In fact, both alternatives are
imperfect.
As we have indicated, the principle reason why government intervention may be necessary is that it is too costly in private transactions to take account of certain consequences of the particular
conduct in question. Government action can reduce the costs of ascertaining and reacting to these consequences in two ways. First, by
having representation of a large group (the general population) by a
much smaller one (the elected representatives) and adopting decisionmaking rules requiring less than unanimity, the costs of reaching
agreement approximating the relevant preferences are reduced,li 2
These are savings that can be achieved through any form of group
organization. Beyond this advantage, however, the government also
has the power of compulsion. This unique aspect of government is
There is not, in this case, simply an asymmetry of information between these markets. If that were the case a subsidy would not be justified because the acquisition of
information expends real resources, and foreign sales should yield enough returns to
cover these costs so that the transaction will be· privately and socially desirable. But
when the private evaluation of risk exceeds the social evaluation there is an e.xternality,
and the export activity might not be optimal without the subsidy. The externality may
arise because the government is unwilling or unable to transmit its store of information
about foreign conditions, which it is continually replenishing in order to conduct international affairs, to private firms that could use that information to appraise risks accurately,
It may be so costly (and possibly for security reasons impossible) to transmit this in•
formation that it is more efficient for the government simply to pay a subsidy to
counteract the private bias against international involvement. See J. BHAGWATl, mpra
note 11, at 13. A similar rationale has been suggested for the role of fixed exchange
rates in reducing the incidence of fluctuations in the relative values of various currencies. See A. LANYI, THE CASE FOR FLOATING ExCHANGE RATES REcONSIDERED (Princeton Essays in Intl. Fin. No. 72, 1969); Willett &: Tower, The Welfare Economics of
International Adjustment, 26 J. FINANCE 287 (1971).
52. For a discussion of how representative government expresses the preferences of
a population, see Haefele, A Utility Theory of Representative Government, 61 Ar.r.
ECON. R.Ev. 350 (1971). See J. BUCHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 63•84, for a
discussion of the choice of an appropriate decision-making rule. A rational individual
would choose a decision-making rule which over a range of issues minimizes the sum
of the costs involved in (I) arriving at a result (where unanimity would be most costly)
and (2) accepting decisions adverse to his position (where unanimity would be least
costly).
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the only means of inducing people in certain circumstances to "reveal" their true preferences-that is, to indicate the value they place
on the external benefits in question. For if payment from all beneficiaries cannot be compelled and there is no way to exclude nonpayers from participating in benefits, all potential beneficiaries will
conceal their preferences in an effort to take a "free ride" on those
who do pay.58 The externalities we have considered, e.g., the spillover benefits derived from research and development and from the
efforts of "pioneer" export firms, are specific instances of this phenomenon.
Obviously, however, a system that does not require unanimity
may yield measures which, because of the differences in the intensity
·with which various preferences are held, do not represent an over-all
increase in welfare. 54 Moreover, whatever system is devised will itself
be costly, for real resources must be employed in operating the political system. Finally, a governmental political solution inevitably
requires a second stage of implementation that also involves costs and
risks of error in measuring the relevant variables. Thus the ultimate
question is whether the government solution, in light of (1) the anticipated departure from optimality resulting from the less than unanimous decision and the difficulties of measurement encountered
upon implementation and (2) the costs of decision-making and implementation, is superior to the private solution that presumably
fails to take the externality into account.
We will not try to deal exhaustively either with the process of
53. Various voluntary arrangements can be devised that also deal with the "free
ride" problem. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 43-62, for a discussion
of the choice among the three alternatives: not taking into account the externality,
devising a private arrangement to do so, and intervening with the coercive power of
government. For a discussion of private arrangements responsive to "free ride" problems encountered in international trade, see Schwartz & Wellman, The Rule of Reason
in EEC Antitrust: Efficiency Enhancement Through Integration by Agreement Among
Competitors, 12 VA. J. INTL. L. 192 (1972).
54. To say, for example, that a majority rule produces outcomes that improve
over-all welfare assumes that the intensity with which voters prefer any given outcome
is equal. This, of course, is rarely the case. A majority vote rule would produce more
favorable outcomes in the welfare terms we have used as our yardstick if side payments
were allowed, that is, if the winning majority could compensate the losing minority
or if an intense minority could be transformed into a majority by "buying" the votes
of those with weak preferences. Buying votes is generally forbidden, but logrolling is a
less perfect way to accomplish the same thing. Since votes are taken over a period of
time on many different issues, about which voters hold preferences of varying intensity,
each voter can place a value on each of his votes and engage in trade with other voters.
By trading their votes, the voters can increase the total welfare they receive from all
measures passed, over what it would be if they had simply voted yes or no on each
measure. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 131-45.
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political decision-making or implementation with respect to subsidies.
We do, however, note certain inefficiencies that are likely to be
encountered. The political process, unlike a functioning market,
does not permit an individual to make a series of discrete choices
among alternatives as they exist at the time the particular decision
is made.55 Instead, preferences must be expressed infrequently by
voting for candidates who are chosen on the basis of their positions
on a ·wide range of issues. 56 As a result, only a very rough approximation of the preferences that account for the selection of a particular
candidate can be made. The representatives must seek to give effect
to these preferences in the legislative process. Moreover, a measure
that is passed cannot, with any exactitude, quantify the preferences
to which it is responsive, for it must operate prospectively and in a
far greater variety of circumstances than the legislature can be expected to anticipate or deal with in any detail. Implementation must
then be entrusted to another set of officials who are to quantify the
relevant preferences and devise appropriate means to give effect to
them. 57
Throughout this process, it is to be expected that the preferences
of beneficiary groups consisting of small numbers of people with
readily identifiable interests will be more effectively expressed than
those of large groups with uncertain and dispersed interests.08 In
the case of legislation regarding subsidies, it is to be anticipated
that as a result of these factors producers will fare much better than
taxpayers. I£ this situation occurs, subsidies in excess of the external
benefits created by the activity may be provided. 09
In sum, then, just as we could not say in principle that a subsidy
inevitably leads to a worse allocation of resources because of the possi55. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. &: MANAGE•
3, 10 (1971).
56. J. BucHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 134-35, view as implicit logrolling
the phenomenon of candidates arriving at positions on the range of issues in which
their constituents are interested in order to gain the total votes required for election.
57. See, e.g., J. BHAcWATI, supra note 11, at 55, concerning inefficient methods of
implementing programs designed to increase import substitution and export promo•
tion; Dam, supra note 47, on the inefficiencies of implementing the oil import quota
system, which was designed to promote national security by attaining a particular level
of domestic production.
58. See J. BUCHANAN &: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 283-95; Stigler, supra note 55,
at 12.
59. This does not necessarily mean that the amount of tax falling on the benefi•
ciaries of a favorable externality will be excessive. Rather, nonbeneficiaries, as well as
beneficiaries, might be taxed, and an amount in excess of the external benefits might
be realized by the producer group.
MENT SCIENCE
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bility that it might accurately give effect to externalities, neither can
we say that a subsidy inevitably leads to a better allocation of resources because of the possibility that it might be based on an overvaluation of the externalities of such magnitude that the result would
be a greater divergence from optimality than if there were no government intervention.
V.

INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS

A. Framing an International Standard

We have now concluded our examination of how subsidization
may be undertaken for the purpose of enhancing efficiency. The
next inquiry is into the contribution a standard for permissible subsidies that is administered by an international body can make in
improving this process. After we examine this question we shall consider the possibility of conferring upon an international institution
legislative power to take account of externalities.
When we speak of a standard, of course, we do not necessarily
mean a rule that can be applied with binding effect by an international tribunal. There is simply little likelihood that rules of this
kind will be accepted by the national governments. All we mean by
a standard is a set of norms that is obligatory in the limited sense that
it is taken seriously in the domestic political process. The functional
role of the international body is to legitimatize and give specific
content to the standard by deciding whether a particular domestic
measure conforms to it.60
There are only a few ways in which a standard could conceivably
contribute to dealing with the question of subsidies. First, it could
implement the notion that particular preferences, which are in fact
held by the people of a country, should not be given weight by
legislators in deciding whether to institute subsidies. Thus, for example, the desire to have a certain portion of the population engage
in agriculture could be said to be "less important" than "efficient"
agricultural production (by which is meant, of course, "efficient" in
terms of all production possibilities and preferences exclusive of
wanting people to engage in agriculture). However, we know of no
objective basis for adopting such a standard.
The second basic notion that could be embodied in an international standard is that the domestic measure is inefficient in terms
60, See J. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 776-80; Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A
Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970); Hudec, supra note 7.
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of the preferences actually held in the country. This judgment could
be made on three bases.
First, it could be asserted that the structure of the domestic
political process is calculated to lead to oversubsidization. 61 There
are empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that oversubsidization is likely to result under existing systems and certain
changes have been suggested that would reduce the incidence of
oversubsidization. For example, it could be required that there be
a greater majority in the legislature or that the burden of a subsidy
be placed not on all taxpayers but rather on the purported beneficiaries, a class better able to assess the benefit and oppose the measure
if they feel it unjustified. 62
We realize that it appears idle to expect that an international
norm, even if embodied in the mildest of recommendations, would
be permitted to influence the domestic political structure. Nevertheless, this seems to be the most fruitful area for further exploration.
The various domestic systems may well be oversubsidizing. It is quite
likely they could be changed in ways that would lead to greater
international efficiency. If an international consensus on the changes
that should be introduced could be reached, it is conceivable that
significant influence could be brought to bear to restructure the
domestic process accordingly. 63
The second respect in which it might be said that a domestic
measure is inefficient is that there are better ways to accomplish its
objectives. I£, for example, the purpose of the measure is to increase
the level of research and development in an industry rather than the
output of the industry, a subsidy geared to output would be inefficient.64 The basic difficulty in approaching a question of this kind
is that it is unlikely that one of the consequences of a domestic
measure will be plainly identified as the objective of the legislation.
The international body would then be required to construe the
domestic legislation and decide what its objective really was. This
61. It could, of course, theoretically lead to undersubsidization as well.
62. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 292.
63. The political system has sometimes as a matter of national choice been struc•
tured in such a way as to counteract the tendency in the legislative process toward
oversubsidization. The executive, often granted considerable latitude in trade matters,
may be viewed as representing the interests of domestic consumer and foreign pro•
ducer, interests that are not taken sufficiently into account by the legislature. See
Schwartz & Kindred, supra note 47, at 294.
64. If, however, it were very costly to monitor research and development, and output
would serve as a reasonable proxy more easily measured, the subsidy geared to output
might be more efficient.
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is not the type of decision that national governments are likely to
empower an international body to make. Nor is it one that the
international body, by reason of its unfamiliarity with the domestic
political process, is well equipped to make even if authorized to do
so. Indeed the question may be impossible to answer. People vote
for legislators for a variety of reasons-including their support of
certain measures. And the reasons a particular individual may prefer
a certain measure are also extremely varied. To conclude, after the
fact, on the basis of evidence of what preferences were held when the
measure was under consideration, that a particular objective was
the only one embraced by people supporting the legislation, may be
little more than an exercise in conjecture-particularly when the
question of what was the objective never really had to be faced by
anyone when the measure was under consideration. Additionally,
if such a conclusion were drawn it would mean that the legislature,
in terms of its own purposes, had done a poor job. National representatives to international bodies would be unlikely to portray the
national legislature in this fashion. Justification on externality
grounds is likely to be offered in virtually every case. The international body would then find it necessary, if the measure is to be
judged inefficient, to take a position on the intent of the legislation
that is at odds with the one advanced by the representatives of the
government concerned.
The final respect in which the domestic process could be said to
be inefficient is that implementation has been faulty. We have talked,
for example, about subsidies for infant export industries. Justification for these subsidies is found in the externalities that accompany
the introduction of new goods of a certain type originating in a
particular country. But any effort to devise and implement a scheme
of subsidies that reflects, with substantial accuracy, the externalities
actually created will encounter great difficulties. The program may
easily degenerate into an indiscriminate grant of subsidies, involving
the risk of political corruption and adding an element of uncertainty
that makes intelligent decision-making about resource allocation extremely difficult. 65 It may be, moreover, that alternative measures, such
as the government's providing information about foreign markets
to domestic producers and about domestic products to foreign buyers,
are better calculated to deal with the basic problem. We do not
believe, however, that an international body could be empowered
65. See

J. BHAGWATI, supra note 11, at 53.
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to make a judgment of this kind. What really must be said after all
is that a domestic measure has been badly, if not corruptly, administered.
Thus we are not very sanguine that a useful international standard can be devised. The key element in any process of constructive
change is a willingness by the various countries concerned to appraise the effectiveness of the domestic political process in passing
legislation granting subsidies.
B. An International Political Institution

The final possibility that we ·wish to consider is that of lodging
power in an international body to deal authoritatively with a sector
of activity marked by externalities. Two types of institutions should
be distinguished. In the first, power is exercised by the international
body on the basis of an agreed upon standard or the votes of individuals. In the second, it is assumed that each country through its political process aggregates individual preferences and then votes in an
international legislature.
The first type of institution would necessarily involve consideration of the fundamental question of how individuals, if they wish to
maximize their welfare, should group themselves and structure the
organization governing them. We cannot, of course, deal with this
hard question. We ·will, however, offer some general observations
which suggest the difficulties that will inevitably be encountered
if the problem of externalities is approached by seeking to establish
an inclusive political unit.
The basic reason for establishing a larger political unit is that
external benefits or costs spill over beyond the borders of the existing political entity and are not, therefore, taken into account in the
decision-making process of the smaller entity. Thus, if the countries
in a particular region have. close relationships, expenditures for research and development or education in one country will have an
important impact on the others. 66 A decision based upon all of the
66. See, e.g., France V-:_ Commission of the European Communities, No. 47 /69 (Eur.
Ct. J. June 25, 1970), in which subsidies to the French textile industry for research and
development, financed by a tax imposed on all textile products both domestic and
imported, were held to be incompatible with article 92, paragraph ll(c) of the EEC
Treaty governing the grant of "state aids" by member states. One French argument
was that since research and development expenditures created spillover benefits for
textile manufacturers located in other member states, their imports to France might
properly be taxed without, in the language of article 92, paragraph ll(c), "adversely
affect[ing] trading conditions to such an extent as would be contrary to the common
interest." This argument, though it was accepted in principle, was rejected by the Court
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effects in all of the countries will, in these circumstances, increase
over-all welfare in the region. 67
There are, however, formidable difficulties in devising an appropriate political system to give effect to these externalities. The basic
dilemma is that as the size of the group embraced by the political
unit increases, conflicting forces dictate that greater or lesser majorities be required to authorize government action. As the group grows
larger, particularly if heterogeneity increases, a particular individual
faces a greater risk of an outcome departing from his preference
being imposed by whatever majority is designated as sufficient. He
therefore will want a rule approaching unanimity to diminish this
risk. But, on the other hand, the larger and more heterogeneous the
group, the more costly is the process of reaching agreement. For this
reason a rule requiring much less than unanimity may be desirable.68
partly because of the difficulty of determining the correct amount and duration of the
subsidy and partly because of an inequality in the benefits betlveen France and the
rest of the EEC, which was not appropriately reflected by the method of financing.
67. Article 92, paragraph 3(b) of the EEC Treaty, which provides that a subsidy
"intended to promote the execution of an important project of common European
interest" may be deemed to be "compatible with the Common Market," represents an
acceptance of this basic idea.
68. J. BUCHANAN 8: G. TULLOCK, supra note 38, at 63-84, analyze the issues confronted in choosing a decision-making rule. The basic objective of each individual is
to minimize the sum of the costs of reaching agreement and being subject to a measure
not in conformity with his preferences. The rule an individual chooses depends on his
prediction of the likelihood that various desirable and undesirable measures will be
passed under different decision-making rules. See note 52 supra. It would appear that
the same considerations would obtain when a national representative, assumed to be
speaking for the aggregated individual preferences in his country, is choosing an appropriate decision-making rule for an international body.
Article 92 of the EEC Treaty appears to be an attempt to resolve certain conflicts
inherent in dealing internationally with problems of externalities through collective
decision-making. It isolates first a class of subsidies (for consumers in general, victims
of natural disasters, and regions affected by the division of Germany) as "compatible"
with Common Market principles of nondistortion in competition, apparently because
it was recognized that government intervention might be required and that the individual countries would wish to formulate their own policies. Article 92 then isolates a
class of subsidies (for depressed regions, projects of European-wide interest, and development programs) that "may be deemed to be compatible with the Common Market." Finally, it specifies that certain subsidies proposed by the Commission (a group
of nine members appointed to act according to their perception of European, rather
than national, interests) and approved by a "qualified majority vote" of the Council
(that is, a weighted vote giving the national representatives of France, Germany, and
Italy four votes, Belgium and The Netherlands tlvo, and Luxembourg one) also "may
be deemed to be compatible with the Common Market." Article 93 invests in the Commission power to determine whether those subsidy programs that "may be" acceptable
under Article 92 are in fact compatible with the Common Market, subject to review
by the Court of Justice. However, the Council, by unanimous vote, may approve any
subsidy.
Article 92 therefore recognizes certain subsidies without further inquiry. In conjunction with Article 93, it sets up a system through which another class of subsidies
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For an individual to be made better off by becoming a member
of a more inclusive political entity, the gains from taking account of
additional external effects must be greater than the diminution in
welfare that he suffers by having power conferred on the larger
entity. We speculate that this advantage will exist only if activities
in the countries involved are closely related and the population of
the affected countries have substantially homogeneous views on the
relevant issues.69
The second type of international institution would be one empowered to deal authoritatively with externalities on the basis of a
voting process participated in by countries on the assumption that
individual preferences have been aggregated in the domestic political
process. It is very difficult to predict the contribution such an institution could make. Each country is presumably most familiar with
the external costs that it suffers and the external benefits it realizes
as a result of the actions of other countries. Each is also presumably
generally aware that its own actions have similar effects on other
countries. If agreement taking these factors into account can improve
the welfare of the countries involved, it will occur. All that the posspecifically identified by their objectives may be justified by the Commission and the
Court of Justice, which presumably represent the informed opinion of the supranational
interest. A third class of unspecified subsidies may be approved in the same manner
only if they are certified by a weighted vote of the Council, This weighting is apparently designed to assign voting power in proportion to the potential harm that a par•
ticular country will suffer if the preferences effectuated by the subsidy clash with those
held in the country. Finally, any subsidy may be approved if all countries agree to
permit it.
69. Article 92 is an obvious example of the kind of cooperation we are describingthat is, collective action in a wide range of situations among nations with relative
homogeneous fundamental interests. It is, however, only an enabling provision permit•
ting individual countries to act. More significant in this connection is the effort cm•
bodied in the European Social Fund, EEC Treaty, articles 123-28, in which contribution
is required from all countries because each presumably benefits from subsidies that
reduce the private costs of relocation and retraining of employees located throughout
the EEC.
A similar conformity of interest may exist among a large number of countries with
respect to a limited class of activity. One illustration of this situation is the Interna•
tional Coffee Agreement, opened for signature March 18-31, 1968, [1968) 19 U.S,T, 6333,
T.I.A.S. No. 6584. Here, countries with a wide and varied range of fundamental in•
terests have agreed to cooperate in one narrow area by limiting the amount of coffee
exported from predominantly developing countries and imported into predominantly
developed countries. The stated objective is to assist diversification by restricting pro•
duction and maintaining price. The Agreement contains an elaborate set of voting
rules in which votes are weighted to reflect the magnitude of producer and consumer
interests. On important issues a two-thirds majority of both importing and exporting
blocs is required. The Agreement in effect requires all consuming countries to share
in the aid-granting and (presumably) all producing countries to restrict output, See
c. FULDA & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 496-537.
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sibility of some species of international compulsion can contribute
is to induce revelation of preferences that would otherwise be concealed by potential "free riders." For example, each of the countries
·wishing to alleviate suffering in the developing countries by widening opportunities in their domestic markets for products originating
in the developing countries might wait for the others to act, particularly if the domestic displacement accompanying increased imports
were of great concern.70
An international legislature competent to deal with these questions could compel action and consequently induce all the countries
to reveal their true preferences. The question, however, is whether,
in light of the relatively small number of countries playing a major
role in questions of this kind and the great heterogeneity of opinion
among those having vital interests, any country could confidently
predict that it would be made better off over time by subjecting these
questions to authoritative resolution by an international body in
which unanimity is not required. It may well be that the present
system of multilateral bargaining is a better method. In that system,
the revelation of preferences is induced by the expectation of gain
from concessions obtainable only if all interested countries combine
to provide benefits in return, but no country is compelled to accept
an outcome that it does not want.71
VI.

CONCLUSION

We have completed our search for a standard and appear not to
have found one. Our conclusion, simply, is that the problem is at
bottom one of devising an appropriate social organization to guide
individual preference and capacity so that over-all welfare is increased. We believe, however, that there is an advantage in acknowledging that this is what is involved. Invocation of a "free trade" ideal
as providing a self-evident answer to questions of this kind serves to
obfuscate the difficult issues that must be faced. We realize, of course,
70. Efforts, through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), to achieve agreement on over-all trade preferences for developing countries
have in fact been made. The developed countries, while willing to adhere in principle
to such an arrangement, have not been prepared to subject themselves to an authoritative international regime. See UNCTAD, Report of the Special Committee on Preferences, Supp. 6A, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.5/36/Rev. 1, at 5-6, 40-41 (1970); Comment,
Generalized Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries: The UNCTAD Agreed Conclusions, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 111 (1971).
71. For descriptions of multilateral bargaining under GATT, see K. DAM, supra
note 1, at 61-79; J. JACKSON, supra note I, at 217-23; Norwood, The Kennedy Round:
A Try at Linear Trade Negotiations, 12 J. LAw & EcoN. 297 (1969).
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that it is possible that a person disapproving of a preference held in
a particular country might wish to cast his objection in apparently
neutral "free trade" terms. If by this is meant some preference for
increased international involvement, then we have no quarrel with
it. Indeed we share it.72 If the suggestion is, however, that a particular
result is better because it is more consonant with a "free trade"
ideal deducible from the theory of comparative advantage, we are
unable to square such a claim ·with our analysis.
72. We believe that there are favorable externalities that arise from trade. These
include the benefits of a more diverse selection of goods, which are reaped even by
those who purchase domestic products; the incentive to domestic innovation benefiting
consumers, which is promoted by increased (foreign) competition; and the possible
reduction in the incidence of conflict among nations, which learn more about each
other through trade. These consequences may not be fully taken into account in either
the market or the domestic political process essentially because the benefits are widely
dispersed and difficult to quantify. There may, however, be some groups with a vested
interest in increasing international trade who can exercise substantial influence on do•
mestic policies. See A. LANYI, supra note 51; Willett &: Tower, supra note 51, at 290
(suggesting that central bankers may be such a group).

